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Abstract
We introduce an infinite-horizon endogenous growth framework for studying
the effects of foreign aid on the economic growth in a recipient country. Aid is
used to partially finance the recipient’s public investment. We point out that the
same rule of aid may have very different outcomes, depending on the recipient’s
circumstances in terms of development level, domestic investment, efficiency in the
use of aid and in public investment, etc. Foreign aid may promote growth in the
recipient country, but the global dynamics of equilibrium are complex (because of
the non-monotonicity and steady state multiplicity). The economy may converge
to a steady state or grow without bounds. Moreover, there are rooms for the
divergence and a two-period cycle. We characterize conditions under which each
scenario takes place. Our analysis contributes to the debate on the nexus between
aid and economic growth and in particular on the conditionality of aid effects.
Keywords: Aid effectiveness, economic growth, cycle, poverty trap, public invest-
ment, threshold.
JEL Classification: H50, O19, O41
1 Introduction
Since the United Nations Summit in September 2000 at which the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals (MDGs) were agreed, foreign aid, in particular, Official Development Assis-
tance (ODA) has been continually increasing. For example, in 2015, development aid
provided by the donors in the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) was
131.6 billion USD, increased by 6.9% in real terms from 2014, and by 83% from 2000.
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Wagner, Antoine Leblois and the participants at 18th Annual Meeting of the Association for Public
Economic Theory, the 2016 Annual Conference of the Public Choice Society, the 65th Annual Meeting of
the French Economic Association (AFSE), the 9th VEAM and the 2nd Workshop ”Sustainability”, the
17th Journe´s Louis-Andre´ Ge´rard-Varet and the Journe´e du BETA for comments and suggestions.
†Emails: ns.pham@montpellier-bs.com, pns.pham@gmail.com. Tel.: +33 (0)4 67 10 28 14.
‡Email: kim.pham@unistra.fr. Tel.: +33 (0)3 68 85 20 77. Fax.: +33 (0)3 68 85 20 70
1
At the same time, bilateral aid, provided by one country to another, risen by 4% in
real terms.1 Many issues are under debate regarding the effectiveness of aid in terms of
economic growth. Indeed, extensive empirical investigations using different data samples
show conflicting results.
On the one hand, some studies show that aid may exert a positive and conditional
effect on economic growth. In a seminal paper Burnside and Dollar (2000) use a database
on foreign aid developed by the World Bank and find that foreign aid has a positive effect
on growth only in recipient countries which have good fiscal, monetary and trade policies.
Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002) use the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional
Assessment (CPIA) as a measure of policy quality and show that aid may promote eco-
nomic growth and reduce the poverty in recipient countries if the quality of their policies
is sufficiently high. The findings in Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001), Chauvet and Guil-
laumont (2003, 2009) indicate that the marginal effect of aid on growth is contingent on
the recipient countries’ economic vulnerability. While economic vulnerability is negatively
associated with growth, the marginal effect of aid on growth is an increasing function of
vulnerability.
On the other hand, other empirical studies, not rejecting the conditionality of aid
effects, show a certain fragility of results and suggest a non-linear effect of aid on growth
(Hansen and Tarp, 2001; Easterly et al., 2004; Islam, 2005; Roodman, 2007; Clemens et
al., 2012; Guillaumont and Wagner, 2014). For example, Islam (2005) shows an aid Laffer
curve in recipient countries with political stability. The effect of aid on growth may be
negative at a high level of aid inflows. Hansen and Tarp (2001) find that the effectiveness
of aid is conditional on investment and human capital in recipient countries and aid has no
effect on growth when controlling for these variables. Their findings shed light on the link
between aid, investment, and human capital and show that aid increases economic growth
through its impact on capital accumulation. Using the same empirical specification like
that in Burnside and Dollar (2000), but expanding the data set sample, Easterly et al.
(2004) nuance the claim from that of these authors. The results on aid effectiveness seem
to be fragile when varying the sample and the definition of different variables such as aid,
growth and good policy (Easterly, 2003).
The aforementioned conflicting results in the literature raise a concern about the effec-
tiveness of foreign aid. Our paper deals with this concern by investigating the following
questions: (1) How the recipient country use foreign aid to enhance economic growth?
(2) What are the determinants of the effectiveness of foreign aid? (3) Why are the effects
of foreign aid significant for some countries but not for others?
To address these questions, we consider a tractable discrete-time infinite-horizon growth
model where public investment, which is financed by foreign aid and capital tax, may im-
prove the total factor productivity (TFP) if it is large enough. Inspired by the empirical
literature, we formulate aid flows taking into account the donor’s rules and the recipient’s
need represented by its initial capital stock. In the case of a poor country, we also con-
sider the efficiency in the use of aid and in public investment, then examine their impacts
on the aid effectiveness. Our model allows us to find explicitly the dynamics of capital
stocks, and provide a full analysis of equilibrium transitional dynamics. We show that if
the initial circumstances of the recipient are good enough (high productivity and initial
capital), the country does not need foreign aid to achieve its development goals. This
1For more information, see http://www.oecd.org/development/development-aid-rises-again-in-2015-
spending-on-refugees-doubles.htm
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result is in line with the findings in growth models with increasing return to scale. Con-
sequently, our analysis focuses on the case in which the recipient country’s initial capital
and productivity are not high. The main results can be described as follows:
First, when the foreign aid is very generous and/or the use of aid is efficient, and the
recipient country has a high quality of circumstances (high and efficient public investment
and/or low fixed cost in public investment), then the economy will grow without bounds
for any level of initial capital stock. Consequently, the country will no longer receive aid
from some date on.
The second case, corresponding to the richest dynamics of equilibrium, is found when
foreign aid is not very generous and the recipient has an intermediate quality of circum-
stances. In this case, we distinguish 2 regimes: (R1) the recipient country focuses on its
domestic investment, characterized by a remarkable level of capital tax financing public
investment, and (R2) it focuses on foreign aid, characterized by the fact that the use of
foreign aid is sufficiently efficient. In the first regime (domestic investment focus), if the
country has sufficient initial capital or/and the foreign aid is quite high, the economy can
grow. Otherwise, it would collapse (i.e., the capital level tends to zero) or stay at the
unique steady state. In the second regime, the transitional dynamics are complex because
of the non-monotonicity of capital dynamics. The non-monotonicity is due to the fact
that the country focuses on foreign aid which decreases when the economy gets better. In
this regime, there are two steady states: the lower one is interpreted as a middle-income
trap while the second one as a poverty trap. Let us present our findings under this regime
R2.
R2.1. We prove that any poor country, receiving a middle-level aid flow and using it
efficiently, always grows at the first stage of its development process and hence will
never collapse. This is intuitive because if the capital stock is very low, the country
receives a significant aid flow which improves its investment. Under mild conditions,
we show that the economy can increasingly converge to the low steady state.
R2.2. However, the convergence may fail in some cases and there may exist a two-period
cycle capital path. The intuition is the following: When a poor country receives aid
at an initial date (date 0), its economy may grow at date 1. By the rule of aid, the
aid flow for date 1 may decrease, leading to a decrease of total public investment at
date 1. Hence, the capital at date 2 may decrease, and so on. Thus, a two-period
cycle may arise.
R2.3. Last, we point out that a poor country, having strong dynamics of capital, can
take advantage of foreign aid to finance its public investment. This may lead it to
overcome the middle-income trap in a finite number of periods and to obtain growth
in the long run. In this case, the recipient will no longer receive aid from some date
on.2
Several empirical studies on the effects of aid and conditionality of aid effectiveness in
different recipient countries may illustrate our theoretical analyses. First, South Korea
offers an illustration for our results in regime R1 and regime R2.3. Indeed, this country
was a recipient country during the period of 1960-1990 (after the Korean War 1950-1953)
and experienced a high domestic investment during this period. South Korea is now
2Strong dynamics of capital are defined in our paper in the sense that there is some value of capital
under the middle-income trap, which produces an output higher than the middle-income trap.
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a developed country and has become a member of the OECD-DAC (since 2010). The
average aid flows have decreased during the period of 1960-1980, from 6.3% to 0.1% of
GDP. It became negative at the beginning of the 1990s.3 Second, our analysis in the
regime R2.1 may be illustrated by the Tunisia case where aid flows have also decreased
during 1960-2003, from 8.1% of GDP in the 1960s to 1.5% during 1990-2003.4
From a theoretical point of view, our paper is closely related to Dalgaard (2008) who
considers that aid flows depend on the recipient’s income per capita and on the donor’s
exogenous degree of inequality aversion. However, there are some differences. First,
Dalgaard (2008) considers an OLG growth model while we use an infinite-horizon model
a` la Ramsey. Second, in Dalgaard (2008), public investments are fully financed by foreign
aid while in our paper public investments are financed, not only by foreign aid but also
by capital tax. In Dalgaard (2008), the transitional dynamics of capital stock are totally
determined by the degree of inequality aversion on the part of the donor. Our contribution
is to show that the transitional dynamics depend not only on the aid rule but also on the
country’s characteristics. In particular, our framework allows us to study whether a poor
country can surpass, not only the low steady state but also the high one and then achieve
growth in the long run.
Our theoretical results complemented by a number of numerical simulations, indicate
that the effects of aid (in the short run and in the long run) are complex, non-linear and
conditional on recipient countries’ characteristics. By the way, our paper is related to and
complements the points in Charterjee et al. (2003), Charteerjee and Tursnovky (2007).
Indeed, Charterjee et al. (2003) examine the effects of foreign transfers on the economic
growth of the recipient country given that foreign transfers are positively proportional
to the recipient’s GDP but are not subject to conditions. They show that their effects
on growth and welfare are different according to the type of transfers, untied or tied to
investment in public infrastructures. Charteerjee and Tursnovky (2007) underly the role
of endogeneity of labor supply as a crucial transmission mechanism for foreign aid.
Our paper is likewise related to the literature on optimal growth with increasing
returns (Romer, 1986; Jones and Manuelli, 1990; Kamihigashi and Roy, 2007) and with
the presence of threshold (Azariadis and Drazen, 1990; Bruno et al., 2009; Le Van et
al., 2010, 2016). Different from numerous papers in this literature, we point out the
role of aid which can provide investment for the least developed country, this helps the
recipient country to evade poverty and potentially obtain positive growth in the long run.
Moreover, policy function in our framework may not be monotonic.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 characterizes the case
of a small recipient country. Section 3 presents the dynamics of capital, in particular, the
poverty trap without international aid. In Section 4, we emphasize the role of foreign aid
by analyzing the conditions for the effectiveness of aid. Section 5 studies effects of aid in
a centralized economy. Section 6 concludes. Technical proofs are presented in Appendix
A.
3See also Marx and Soares (2013) and Guillaumont and Guillaumont Jeanneney (2010).
4See also Guillaumont and Guillaumont Jeanneney (2010).
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2 A small economy with foreign aid
This section presents our framework. We consider an economy with infinitely-lived iden-
tical consumers and a representative firm. The population size is constant over time and
normalized to unity. Labor is exogenous and inelastic. The representative firm produces
a single good, which can be used for either consumption or investment. The government
uses capital tax and foreign aid to finance public investment (including R&D investment)
which can improve the total factor productivity. The waste in aid spending is considered
by the presence of unproductive aid. The latter has no direct effect on the household’s
welfare, nor on the production process. The fraction of wasteful aid may reflect the degree
of inefficiency (including corruption) in the use of aid.
2.1 Foreign aid and public investment
The literature on aid conditionalities has a large consensus on the recipient’s need as a
significant criterion of aid allocation: countries with a high need should receive a high
amount of aid. This criterion, among others, is used in several bilateral and multilateral
aid policies. For instance, the World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA)
uses a specific rule of aid allocation which gives priority to the poorest countries and also
those with the ability to use aid effectively. Compared to the IDA, the Asian Development
Bank formula assigns a higher weight to recipient countries’ poverty, but a lower weight
to the recipient’s population size.5 In a study for the 2008 Development Cooperation
Forum at the UN Economic and Social Council, Andersson (2008) (Box 1 and Figure 7)
evoked different factors, including initial income, influencing the form of aid allocation.
Other studies (Carter, 2014; Guillaumont and Wagner, 2015; McGillivray and Pham,
2017) provided more details on these aid allocation rules and mentioned a formula of aid
allocated to a recipient country as a function of its poverty.
In this sense, we can assume that aid per capita at takes the following form:
at = (a¯− φkt)+ ≡ max{a¯− φkt, 0} (1)
where a¯ > 0, the maximal aid amount that the recipient country can receive, and φ,
independent of the per capita capital, may be referred to all exogenous rules imposed by
the donor.
Equation (1) means that the higher the per capita capital kt, the lower the country
ranks in its need, then the lower the aid received. A similar assumption may be found in
Carter (2014) and Dalgaard (2008).6 The form of equation (1) implies that a decrease in
φ and/or an increase in a¯ lead(s) to a higher aid flow. Moreover, from a threshold (a¯/φ)
5Other international institutions such as the Asian Development Bank, the European Development
Fund, the UK’s Department for International Development, etc. use different variants of this rule.
6Carter (2014) (page 135) considers that aid flow received by country i is positively correlated with
country performance rating as underlined in Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002) (with index Country Policy
and Institutional Assessment) and is negatively associated with income per capita. Dalgaard (2008)
assumes that per capita flow of aid at time t is also a reversed function of income of per capita at period
(t − 1), at = θyλt−1, where θ > 0 and λ < 0. In this aid function, λ reflects the degree of inequality
aversion of the donor. Parameter θ represents exogenous determinants of aid. Although Appendix C.2 in
Dalgaard (2008) presents a generalized aid allocation rule, it seems that this rule does not cover the form
of (1) because the function (a¯− φx)+ is not differentiable. Our analyses of effects of threshold (a¯/φ) are
an added-value of our paper.
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of capital, the recipient country no longer receives aid. In Section 4.5, we will work under
a general form of aid.
The positive couple (a¯, φ) is interpreted as the aid rule imposed by the donor. It is
taken as given by the recipient country and represents aid conditionalities. Allocation of
aid may be conditional on the policy performance as underlined in Burnside and Dollar
(2000), Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002). According to these authors, a country with a high
policy quality is more able to use aid in an efficient way. Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001)
focus on a fairness argument when they focus on the recipient’s economic vulnerability:
more aid should be provided to countries with a high economic vulnerability since in these
countries aid would be more efficient. This argument also fits in a philosophy of fairness
which proposes that aid should compensate the recipient country for its vulnerable initial
situation (in macroeconomic conditions or lack of human capital), so that all countries can
begin at the same initial opportunities. McGillivray and Pham (2017), Guillaumont et
al. (2017) consider the lack of human capital as a determinant criterion. Other analyses
underline the link between aid and political variables (strategic allies, former colonial
status, and the ability to use aid effectively), between aid and macroeconomic conditions
(trade openness, commercial allies, etc.) (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Berthelemy and
Tichit, 2004). All these factors are exogenous for the recipient country as they are chosen
by donors and may be considered as different interpretations of the parameter φ. Equation
(1) may reflect a trade-off between needs (low initial capital) and country-selectivity (high
φ) or a compatibility between needs (low initial capital) and country-selectivity (low φ)
based on aid performance or other criteria.
The recipient country uses aid and tax on capital to finance public investment which
improves private capital productivity. Since some spending of aid is wasted in most
recipient countries, there is a significant part of the unproductive activity, noted as aut .
This is potentially explained by corruption, administrative fees, etc. Then, the attribution
of aid may be written as:
at = a
i
t + a
u
t (2)
where ait represents the part of aid which contributes to the public investment of the
recipient country. If we consider a fixed fraction of aid for each activity, we can rewrite
equation (2) as follows:
at = αiat + αuat
with αu = 1− αi. Parameter αu ∈ (0, 1) reflects the degree of inefficiency (including the
corruption) in the use of aid while αi represents the efficiency in the use of aid.
Let us denote Bt the public investment financed by tax on capital and by aid, Bt may
be written as:
Bt = Tt−1 + ait (3)
where Tt−1 is the tax at period t− 1. We assume that Tt−1 = τKt used to finance public
investment which will have its effect at date t. Since, all capital tax is used to fund public
investment, τ may be interpreted as the government effort in financing public investment.7
7The amount Tt = τKt+1 in our model can be viewed as the total expenditure in R&D which may
affect the TFP. In this sense, τ should be lower than 1 as the total expenditure in R&D in most countries
does not exceed 4% of the GDP. Only the South Korea’s R&D expenditure exceeds 4%; in 2016, it was
4.2% of the GDP (according to the World Bank database). However, in our theoretical analyses, we do
not need that τ ≤ 1.
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The positive effect of foreign aid on public investment is an obvious finding in empirical
studies (Khan and Hoshino, 1992; Franco-Rodrigez et al., 1998; Ouattara, 2006; Feeny
and McGillivray, 2010).
2.2 Production with endogenous productivity
At each date, the representative firm maximizes its profit. The production function at
date t is given by Ft(Kt) = AtKt where Kt represents the capital while At represents the
total factor productivity. In the spirit of Barro (1990), we assume that At is endogenous
and depends on public investment Bt as follows:
At ≡ A
[
1 + (σBt − b)+
]
. (4)
Parameter A ∈ (0,∞) is interpreted as autonomous productivity. Parameter σ ∈
(0,∞) measures the extent to which the public investment translates into technology
and it reflects the efficiency of public investment. So, σBt can be viewed as a flow of
new technology/innovation generated by the investment Bt. Parameter b is the threshold
from which the flow of technology σBt has a strictly positive impact on the TFP. The
threshold b may be viewed as a fixed cost or setup cost (Azariadis and Drazen, 1990).8
When Bt ≤ b/σ, we have (σBt− b)+ = 0, and then At = A. This means that the positive
effect of public investment on total productivity is observed only from the level b/σ. In
Section 4.5, we will work under a general form of TFP At.
According to (3) and (4), foreign aid has a significant effect on the capital productivity
and production only if ait ≥ b/σ − τKt. As in Charterjee et al. (2003), Charteerjee
and Tursnovky (2007), Dalgaard (2008), we consider that aid is used to finance public
expenditures. However, for countries with low capital (in the sense that στKt < b),
aid should be higher than a critical level to improve the technology which is necessary
for positive growth in the long run.9 This assumption may be referred to the big push
concept of aid supported by Sachs (2005) and discussed in Guillaumont and Guillaumont
Jeanneney (2010). Our setup is also supported by Wagner (2014) who uses a database
including 89 recipient countries and identified the existence of a critical level above which
aid is effective in terms of economic growth.
At each period t, given Bt, rt, the representative firm maximizes its profit:
(Pft) : pit ≡ max
Kt≥0
(
Ft(Kt)− rtKt
)
It is straightforward to obtain rt and pit for a competitive economy:
rt = A
[
1 +
(
σBt − b
)+]
and pit = 0. (5)
Remark 1. We may introduce a more general setup
A′t ≡ A
[
1 +
(
σ(Bt − b1)+ − b2
)+]
. (6)
8Our setup (4) is related to that in Bruno et al. (2009). The role of b (resp., σBt)in our framework is
similar to that of the parameter X (resp., Ye,t) in Bruno et al. (2009).
9Our setup is different from that in Dalgaard (2008). Indeed, Dalgaard (2008) considers a production
function: yt = k
α
t g
1−α
t , where gt represents government services, entirely financed by international aid at.
This means that the first dollars received from donors have a positive effect on the recipient’s production.
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where b¯1 represents the fixed cost due to, for example, bribery and b2 plays the role of
b in (4). Notice that A′t = A
[
1 +
(
σBt − b)+
]
where b ≡ σb1 + b2. So, our main results
still hold under this general setup. However, there is a difference in terms of implications
which will be discussed in Remark 3.
2.3 Household
Let us consider the representative consumer’s optimization problem. She maximizes her
intertemporal utility by choosing consumption and capital sequences (ct, kt):
(Pc) : max
(ct,kt+1)
+∞
t=0
+∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct)
s.t: ct + kt+1 + Tt ≤ (1− δ)kt + rtkt + pit
where k0 > 0 is given, β is the rate of time preference and u(·) is the consumer’s instan-
taneous utility function. Tt is the tax, rt is the capital return while pit is the firm’s profit
at date t.
For the sake of tractability, we assume that the consumer knows that Tt = τkt+1 and
instantaneous utility function is logarithmic, u(ct) = ln(ct). According to Lemma 8 in
Appendix A.1, we establish the relationship between kt+1 and kt
kt+1 = β
1− δ + rt
1 + τ
kt. (7)
Since the utility function is strictly concave, the solution is unique.
2.4 Intertemporal equilibrium
Definition 1 (intertemporal equilibrium). Given tax rate τ , a list (rt, ct, kt, Kt, at) is an
intertemporal equilibrium if:
1. (ct, kt) is a solution of the problem Pc, given a
i
t, rt, pit.
2. (Kt) is a solution of the problem Pft, given Bt and rt.
3. (Market clearing conditions) Kt = kt and ct + kt+1 + Tt = (1− δ)kt + Yt.
4. The government budget is balanced: Tt = τkt+1.
5. (Rule of Aid) at = max{a¯− φkt, 0} and ait = αiat.
Combined with (5), the dynamics of capital stock may be rewritten as follows:10
kt+1 = G(kt) ≡ f(kt)kt (8a)
where f(kt) ≡ β
1− δ + A
[
1 +
(
σ(τkt + αi(a¯− φkt)+)− b
)+]
1 + τ
. (8b)
This dynamic system is non-linear and non-monotonic. The next sections analyze the
global dynamics of capital stocks (kt) and the effects of international aid on the recipient’s
economic growth. Before doing this, it is useful to introduce some notions of growth and
collapse.
10We implicitly assume that
∑
t β
tu(Gt(k0)) < ∞ where G0(k0) ≡ k0 and Gt+1(k0) = G(Gt(k0))
∀t ≥ 1. This ensures that the intertemporal utility is finite.
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Definition 2 (growth, collapse, and poverty trap).
1. The economy collapses if limt→∞ kt = 0. It grows without bounds if limt→∞ kt =∞.
2. A value k¯ is called a trap if, for any initial capital stock k0 < k¯, we have kt < k¯ for
any t high enough.
Our formal definition of trap means that a poor country (k0 ≤ k¯) continues to be
poor. It is in line with the notion of poverty trap in Azariadis and Stachurski (2005): A
poverty trap is a self-reinforcing mechanism which causes poverty to persist.
3 Equilibrium dynamics without foreign aid
This section considers an economy which does not receive foreign aid. Its public invest-
ment Bt is entirely financed by tax revenue. We will analyze the transitional dynamics of
capital. From equation (8a), we have:
kt+1 = fb(kt)kt, where fb(kt) ≡ β
1− δ + A
[
1 +
(
στkt − b
)+]
1 + τ
(9)
Let us denote:
ra ≡ β 1− δ + A
1 + τ
. (10)
We observe fb(kt) ≥ ra for any t. Therefore, we have:
Remark 2 (role of autonomous technology). Consider an economy without aid. If ra > 1,
the economy will grow without bounds.11
Condition ra > 1 is equivalent to A >
1+τ
β
+ δ− 1. If we define the subjective interest
rate ρ by (1 + ρ)β = 1, then 1+τ
β
+ δ − 1 = (1 + τ)(1 + ρ) + δ − 1 ≈ τ + ρ+ δ which can
be interpreted as the investment cost. By consequence, condition ra > 1 means that the
autonomous productivity is higher than the investment cost. Under this condition the
economy will have growth whatever the levels of other factors such as: initial capital or
efficiency of public investment. In this case, the country does not need foreign aid to get
economic growth. Since our purpose is to look at the impacts of public investment and
foreign aid, from now on, we will work under the following assumption.
Assumption 1 (for the rest of the paper). ra ≤ 1 or equivalently,
A ≤ 1+τ
β
+ δ − 1.
Under this assumption, the economy would never reach economic growth in the long
run without public investment Bt (in infrastructure, in R&D program, etc.). Public
investment Bt is then required to improve technology, and this is necessary for a positive
economic growth in the long run.
According to equation (9) and the fact that fb(kt) is an increasing function, we get
the following properties concerning the dynamics of capital stock:
11In this case, fb(kt) ≥ ra > 1, then kt+1 > kt for any t.
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Proposition 1 (poverty trap and growth: role of public investment). Consider an econ-
omy with a low level of autonomous technology (Assumption 1 holds), and without foreign
aid. The public investment in technology is entirely financed by tax revenue. The dynamics
of capital, characterized by equation (9), are as follows:
1. If fb(k0) > 1, i.e., στk0 > b+D, then (kt) increases and the economy grows without
bounds.
2. If fb(k0) < 1, i.e., στk0 < b+D, then (kt) decreases and the economy collapses.
3. If fb(k0) = 1, i.e., στk0 = b+D, then kt = k0 for any t.
There exists a unique steady state k∗∗, and k∗∗ = b+D
τσ
where
D ≡ 1
A
(1 + τ
β
+ δ − 1
)
− 1 ≥ 0. (11)
0
0
2
4
6
8
10
k∗∗
k
G
(k
)
y = G(k)
y = k
Figure 1: Transitional dynamics of capital without foreign aid and ra < 1.
We may interpret b as a fixed cost of public investment. If the return of public
investment (σBt ≡ στk0), also interpreted as the flow of new technology, is less than
b + D, public investment τk0 does not make any change to the total factor productivity.
Following this interpretation, b + D can be viewed as the threshold so that if the return
of public investment in R&D (σBt) is less than this level, there is no growth of capital
stock, i.e. kt+1 < kt for all t.
Figure 1 illustrates Proposition 1.12 The point of interaction between the convex curve
and the first bisector corresponds to the unstable steady state k∗∗ which is considered as
a poverty trap for this economy (see Definition 2). For all initial capital k0 higher than
k∗∗ (corresponding to στk0 > b+D), the economy will grow without bounds while it will
collapse if the initial capital is lower than k∗∗. It should be noticed that k∗∗ is decreasing
in A, σ but increasing in b. This means that an economy having a high autonomous
technology A, high efficiency σ and low fixed cost b in public investment, obtains a higher
probability to surpass its poverty trap as the condition στk0 > b+D is more likely to be
satisfied.
12In Figure 1, parameters are β = 0.8, δ = 0.2, A = 0.5, τ = 0.4, σ = 2, a¯ = 0, b = 2.
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4 Equilibrium dynamics with foreign aid
Point 2 of Proposition 1 shows that the economy collapses without international aid if
στk0 < b + D. Since we want to investigate the effectiveness of aid, we will work under
the following assumption in Section 4:
Assumption 2 (for the whole Section 4).
στk0 < D + b (12)
where D is defined by (11)
Given this pessimistic initial situation of the recipient country, we examine how in-
ternational aid could generate positive perspectives in the short run as well as in the
long run. Recall that kt+1 = G(kt). Before exploring the dynamics of capital stock, it is
essential to underline properties of function f(k) and G(k). To do so, we introduce some
notations
x1 ≡ a¯/φ, x2 ≡ σαia¯− b
σ(αiφ− τ) , x3 ≡
1− δ + A(1 + σαia¯− b)
2Aσ(αiφ− τ) . (13)
Let us explain the meaning of x1, x2, x3. First, x1 is the maximum level of capital
stock so that the recipient country does not receive international aid. Second, when
the country receives aid, x2 is the critical threshold from which public investment Bt
(financed by aid and tax revenue) has a positive impact on productivity (x2 is a solution
to σ
(
τk+αi(a¯−φk)
)− b) = 0. Last, when the country receives aid (i.e., a¯−φk > 0) and
public investment has positive impact on productivity (i.e., σ
(
τk + αi(a¯− φk)
)− b > 0),
x3 is a local-maximum point of function G (because f
′
3(x3) = 0) where
f3(x) ≡ β
1− δ + A
[
1 +
(
σ(τx+ αi(a¯− φx))− b
)]
1 + τ
x. (14)
Lemma 1 (increasingness of G). The function G is increasing on [0,∞) if one of the
following conditions is satisfied.
1. τ ≥ αiφ.
2. τ < αiφ and σαia¯ < b (which imply that x2 < 0).
3. τ < αiφ, σαia¯ > b and x3 > min(x1, x2).
Condition τ ≥ αiφ means that the government effort is high (τ is high or/and αi is
low). In this case, the policy function is increasing. In point 2, the policy function G
is also increasing because the flow of aid αi(a¯ − φx)+ plays no role on the endogenous
productivity. Conditions in point 3 mean that the government effort is low, the maximum
level of aid a¯ and/or the efficiency of public investment σ is high with respect to the fixed
cost b, and the local-maximum point of output is high enough.
When the local-maximum point is not high enough, the policy function G may not be
increasing.
Lemma 2 (non-monotonicity ofG). Assume that τ < αiφ, σαia¯ > b, and x3 < min(x1, x2).
Then G is increasing on [0, x3], decreasing on [x3,min(x1, x2)], and increasing on [min(x1, x2),∞).
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Proofs of Lemmas 1, and 2 are presented in Appendix A.2.
We can find non-trivial fixed points (capital steady states) by computing strictly pos-
itive solutions of the equation G(k) = k, or equivalently f2(k) ≡ τk+αi(a¯−φk)+ = D+bσ .
Lemma 3 (steady states).
1. If σa¯min(αi, τ/φ) > D + b, then there is no fixed point.
2. Consider the case where σa¯min(αi, τ/φ) ≤ D + b.
(a) If τ > αiφ, which implies σa¯αi ≤ D + b, then the unique fixed point is{
k∗ ≡ D+bσ −a¯αi
τ−αiφ ∈ (0, a¯/φ) if σa¯τ/φ > D + b
k∗∗ ≡ D+b
τσ
∈ (a¯/φ,∞) if σa¯τ/φ < D + b.
(15)
(b) If τ < αiφ, which implies σa¯τ/φ ≤ D + b, then
i. If σa¯αi < D + b, then the unique fixed point is k
∗∗ ≡ D+b
τσ
∈ (a¯/φ,∞).
ii. If σa¯αi > D + b, then there are two fixed points k
∗ ≡ a¯αi−D+bσ
αiφ−τ ∈ (0, a¯/φ)
and k∗∗ ≡ D+b
τσ
∈ (a¯/φ,∞).13
Proof. See Appendix A.2.14
4.1 Growth under high-quality circumstances
This section investigates effects of aid on the recipient prospects when the recipient coun-
try has high-quality circumstances in terms of efficiency in the use of aid, fixed cost and
efficiency in public investment, autonomous technology, etc.
Proposition 2 (growth without bounds thanks to foreign aid). Considering an aid re-
cipient under a poverty trap without aid, characterized by condition (12). The dynamics
of capital with foreign aid are characterized by (8a).
If
rd ≡ β
1 + τ
[
1− δ + A
(
1 +
(
σa¯min(αi, τ/φ)− b
)+)]
> 1
or equivalently, σa¯min(αi, τ/φ) > D + b, (16)
then we have that,
1. the economy will grow without bounds for any level of initial capital k0,
2. international aid at = (a¯ − φkt)+ decreases in t. Consequently, there exists a time
T such that aid flows at = 0 for any t ≥ T .
13Condition σa¯αi > D + b ensures that k
∗ > 0.
14In Appendix A.2, we also study the case where τ = αiφ but in the main text we do not focus on this
case because it is not generic and the result in this case is similar to that in Proposition 3.
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Proposition 2 can be proved by using point 4 of Lemma 1 and point 1 of Lemma 3.
Notice that in this case, G is increasing and a steady state does not exist.
Condition (16) in Proposition 2 may be written as follows
σa¯
τ
φ
> D + b and σαia¯ > D + b, (17)
where D is given by equation (11). Two conditions in (17) mean that the foreign aid is
generous (high a¯ and low φ) and/or the recipient country has high-quality circumstances
(that is, a high efficiency σ and low fixed cost b in public investment, and/or a high level
of autonomous technology A). In particular, the first condition in (17) may be associated
with a high government effort (high τ) in financing public investment while the second
condition may be associated with a high efficiency in the use of aid (high αi). In other
words, given aid flows and the donor’s rules characterized by the couple (a¯, φ), condition
(17) is more likely to be satisfied if the recipient country has high-quality circumstances,
decisive for the effectiveness of aid.
Proposition 2 presents the best and ideal scenario since whatever the initial capital,
generous aid combined with high-quality circumstances could help the recipient country to
grow without bounds in the long run. Figure 2 illustrates this proposition under condition
(16).15 The graph on the left corresponds to the case αi < τ/φ and that on the right
corresponds to the case αi > τ/φ. We observe that, without foreign aid (corresponding
to a¯ = 0), the dynamics of capital are similar to that in Figure 1 and there is one poverty
trap. Thanks to development aid, the dynamics of capital change and they are represented
by the curve above the first bisector.
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
1
2
3
4
5
G(k) with αi < τ/φ
0 5 10 15 20 25
0
5
10
15
20
25
G(k) with αi > τ/φ
Figure 2: Growth without bounds. Conditions ra < 1 and (16) holds
Remark 3. Assume that the TFP is A′t := A [1 + σ(Bt − b1)+] instead of (4). Assume
also that αia¯ < b1, αiφ > τ and β
1−δ+A
1+τ
< 1. If x ∈ [0, a¯/φ], then we have
f(x) = β
1− δ + A
[
1 + σ
(
αia¯− (αiφ− τ)x− b1
)+]
1 + τ
= β
1− δ + A
1 + τ
< 1.
15 Parameters in Figure 2 are β = 0.8; τ = 0.4; δ = 0.2;A = 0.4;σ = 2;αi = 0.8; a¯ = 17, b = 2, φ = 2
verifying conditions ra < 1 and (16). On the left: φ = 0.4. On the right: φ = 2.
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By consequence, we have limt→∞ kt = 0 for any k0 ≤ a¯/φ, whatever the level of efficiency
σ. This is different from Proposition 2 where limt→∞ kt = 0 if σ is high enough. This is
due to the presence of threshold b1 which implies that A
′
t = A for any Bt ≤ b1, whatever
the level of σ. We refer to Le Van et al. (2016) for endogenous threshold in an optimal
growth model.
4.2 Growth or collapse? The role of aid
We are now interested in the case where condition (16) is not satisfied: recipient coun-
tries do not have high-quality circumstances and/or aid flows, subject to conditions, are
bounded, due to the budget constraint from the donors. In the next sections, we will
work under the following condition:
Assumption 3 (for the rest of the paper).
σa¯min(αi, τ/φ) < D + b. (18)
From (18), we can identify three cases:
Low circumstances:
στ
φ
<
D + b
a¯
and σαi <
D + b
a¯
(19a)
Intermediate circumstances 1 (domestic investment focus): σαi <
D + b
a¯
<
στ
φ
(19b)
Intermediate circumstances 2 (aid focus):
στ
φ
<
D + b
a¯
< σαi (19c)
In both (19b) and (19c), we have σa¯min(αi, τ/φ) < D + b < σa¯max(αi, τ/φ). However,
we distinguish two intermediate circumstances: one with domestic investment focus when
αiφ < τ , that is the government investment (measured by τ) is quite high with respect to
the efficiency degree in the use of aid (measured by αi); and another with aid focus when
αi > τ/φ, that is the use of aid is quite efficient.
We firstly consider the cases of low circumstances and the domestic investment focus.
According to Lemma 1, we have the following result.
Proposition 3 (growth or collapse? The role of aid). Consider an aid recipient under
poverty trap without aid, characterized by condition (12): στk0 < D+b. Assume that one
of three conditions in Lemma 1 holds. Then (kt) is monotonic in t and the transitional
dynamics of (kt) are characterized as follows.
1. If f(k0) > 1, i.e.,
(
σ(τk0 + αi(a¯ − φk0)+) − b
)+
> D, then (kt) increases and the
economy grows without bounds. Consequently, there exists a time T such that aid
flows at = 0 for any t ≥ T .
2. If f(k0) < 1, i.e.,
(
σ(τk0 + αi(a¯ − φk0)+) − b
)+
< D, then (kt) decreases and the
economy collapses. Consequently, there exists a time T1 such that aid flows at > 0
for any t ≥ T1.
3. If f(k0) = 1, then kt = k0 for any t.
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Moreover, following Lemma 3, we have:
The unique steady state =
{
k∗∗ = D+b
τσ
∈ (a¯/φ,∞) if (19a) holds (low circumstances)
k∗ = a¯αi−
D+b
σ
αiφ−τ (0, a¯/φ) if (19b) holds (intermediate circumstances 1).
We are considering a country with a low initial capital stock in the sense that στk0 <
b+D (Assumption 2). According to Proposition 3, we observe that: given such an initial
capital stock k0, if the aid rule is generous (in the sense that a¯ is high and/or φ is low)
and the use of aid is efficient (αi is high) so that
(
σ(τk0 +αi(a¯− φk0)+)− b
)+
> D, then
the economy will grow without bounds. Otherwise, the economy will collapse or stay at
the steady state. In other words, the development aid might help the recipient to surpass
its poverty trap while this is impossible without foreign assistance. Our result indicates
that low-income and vulnerable countries need not only a large scaling-up of aid but also
the efficiency in the use of aid (parameter αi) to help them to get out of the poverty trap.
Our finding may be considered as a theoretical illustration for the argument evoked in
Kraay and Raddatz (2007) using a Solow model.16
We observe that the poverty trap in the intermediate circumstances 1 (with domestic
investment focus) is k∗, which is lower that k∗∗, i.e. the poverty trap in the low circum-
stances. This means that the intermediate circumstances give a better outcome than the
low circumstances as the recipient’s possibility of escaping its poverty trap is higher in
the intermediate circumstances.
4.3 Stability, fluctuations or take-off? The complexity of aid’s
effects
We have so far analyzed three circumstances (high, low and intermediate circumstances
1 with domestic investment focus) in which the capital path (kt) is monotonic. In these
cases, the recipient country may or may not fully exploit the same flow of aid following
its initial situation. This section focuses on the remaining cases characterized by the
following assumption:
Assumption 4 (for the whole Section 4.3).
1. στ/φ < D+b
a¯
< σαi (condition (19c) - intermediate circumstances 2 with aid focus)
2. 0 < x3 < min(x1, x2) where x1, x2, x3 are given by (13).
Assumption 4 means that: (1) the government investment is low (i.e. τ is low) but the
use of aid is quite efficient (i.e. αi is quite hight); (2) the maximum level of aid a¯ and/or
the efficiency of public investment σ are quite high with respect to the fixed cost b, but
the local-maximum point x3 of function G is not high enough (i.e. dynamics of capital
are not very strong) to surpass thresholds x1, x2. Notice that if Assumption 4 is violated,
we recover analyses in the previous sections.
16In a Solow model with two exogenous saving rates, there are two steady states which are locally
stable. Kraay and Raddatz (2007) indicate that in such a model, if the saving rate is low, foreign aid
could help the recipient to accumulate capital. Saving rate might jump to the higher level, and then, the
economy would converge to the high steady state.
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Under Assumption 4, G is not monotonic. It is increasing on [0, x3], decreasing on
[x3,min(x1, x2)], and increasing on [min(x1, x2),∞). By combining Assumption 4, Lemma
2 and point (2.b.i) of Lemma 3, there exist two steady states :
low steady state k∗ =
a¯αi − D+bσ
αiφ− τ ∈ (0, a¯/φ), and high steady state k
∗∗ =
D + b
τσ
∈ (a¯/φ,∞).
It is easy to see that the high steady state k∗∗ is unstable. The main question in this
section is whether the recipient country can encompass the high steady state and attain
an economic take-off. It is also about to investigate whether the capital stock converges
to the low steady state or fluctuates around it.
Let us start by considering a poor country (i.e., k0 is low).
Proposition 4. Assume that σαia¯ > D + b. When the initial capital stock k0 is low
enough, the capital stock at the next period will be higher than k0: k1 > k0.
Proof. Condition σαia¯ > D+ b ensures that f(0) > 1. Since the function f is continuous,
f(k0) > 1 for any k0 low enough. By consequence, k1 = G(k0) = f(k0)k0 > k0.
Proposition 4 leads to an important implication: any poor country (characterized by
Assumption 4) receiving foreign aid and using it efficiently always grows at the first stage
of its development process (see Figure 3 for an illustration, with k0 sufficiently far from
the low steady state). In this case, aid may not promote growth but the economy never
collapses: this is an important difference between the case of intermediate circumstances
with aid focus and the cases of low circumstances or intermediate circumstances with
domestic investment focus (which may rise a collapse). It follows that we should provide
development aid for such poor countries.
However, our result does not mean that we should provide more development aid for
any country at any stage of its development. A natural question arises: What happens to
poor or developing countries (having a low or middle value of k0)? We will address this
question in next subsections.
4.3.1 Stability and fluctuations
We start this section by considering the stability of capital path.
Proposition 5 (stability of low steady state). Let Assumption 4 be satisfied.
1. Considering the case where σa¯αi < D + b +
1
A
(
1+τ
β
)
, or equivalently x3 > k
∗. We
have that: if k0 ∈ (0, k∗), then kt ∈ (0, k∗) for any t and limt→∞ kt = k∗.
2. Considering the case where σa¯αi > D + b +
1
A
(
1+τ
β
)
, or equivalently x3 < k
∗. The
steady state k∗ is locally stable17 if and only if
σa¯αi < D + b+
2
A
(
1 + τ
β
)
(20)
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
17It means that there exists  > 0 such that limt→∞ kt = k∗ for any k0 ∈ (k∗ − , k∗ + ).
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Recall that we are considering στk0 < D + b, i.e., k0 < k
∗∗ the country is in a situation
sufficiently vulnerable to have a possibility of collapse if there is no aid (according to point
1 of Proposition 1). Point 1 of Proposition 5 shows the role of aid: a country receiving
development aid may converge to some point. This may happen under Assumption 4
and x3 > k
∗, that is the low steady state is lower than the local-maximum point (x3)
of output. This finding complements Proposition 2 and Proposition 3: foreign aid may
promote growth in the recipient country. It should be noticed that Propositions 2, 3
and 5 consider different circumstances (high, low, intermediate 1 and intermediate 2
circumstances) which are not overlapped.
Figure 3 illustrates Proposition 5.18 On the left we have x3 > k
∗, and limt→∞ kt = k∗
for any k0 ∈ (0, k∗). However the convergence of capital stock may fail when x3 < k∗.
Indeed, point 2 of Proposition 5 shows that there may be room for local instability when
k0 is around the low steady state.
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Figure 3: Assumption 4 is satisfied. On the left: x3 > k∗. On the right: x3 < k∗ and (20)
holds.
Another question arises: is there fluctuation of capital paths or cycle around the low
steady state? Our analysis is based on the following intermediate result.
Lemma 4. Assume conditions in Assumption 4 hold and x3 < k
∗. Assume also that
σa¯αi > D + b+
2
A
(
1 + τ
β
)
. (21)
Then, there exists y1 ∈ (x3, k∗) and y2 > 0 in (0, x2) such that
y1 6= y2, f3(y1) = y2, f3(y2) = y1. (22)
Moreover, if we add assumption that G(y1) < x2, then such values y1, y2 satisfy
y1 6= y2, G(y1) = y2, G(y2) = y1. (23)
18Parameters in Figure 3. On the left: β = 0.5; τ = 0.2; δ = 0.2;A = 0.5;σ = 0, 8;αi = 0.8; a¯ = 10, φ =
2, b = 1. On the right: β = 0.8; τ = 0.2; δ = 0.2;A = 0.4;σ = 1;αi = 0.7; a¯ = 12, φ = 2, b = 3.
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Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Considering y1, y2 determined by (23) of Lemma 4, let us denote
F0 ≡ {y1, y2}, Ft+1 ≡ G−1(Ft) ∀t ≥ 0, F ≡ ∪t≥0Ft.
The following result is a direct consequence of Lemma 4 and definition of F .
Proposition 6 (a two-period cycle around the low steady state). Under Assumption 4
and conditions in Lemma 4, we have: if k0 ∈ F , then there exists t0 such that k2t = y1,
k2t+1 = y2 for any t ≥ t0.
Figure 4: Fluctuation around the low steady state. Condition (21) holds and x3 < k∗.
Proposition 6 indicates that if the initial capital belongs to F of R+, there is neither
possibility for the recipient country to converge to the low steady state, nor the possibility
of reaching an economic take-off.19 The key for obtaining Proposition 6 is condition (21)
which is equivalent to 31+τ
β
− (1− δ) < A(1 + σαia¯− b). This holds if and only if
1 + σαia¯ > b and A >
31+τ
β
− (1− δ)
1 + σαia¯− b (24)
It means that the maximum of aid a¯ and the efficiency in the use of aid and the TFP are
quite high.
The intuition of Proposition 6 is the following: consider a country having a middle-
level of initial capital and satisfying condition (24), when it receives aid at the initial date,
its economy may grow at date 1 (according to Proposition 4). When the economy grows,
its capital at date 1 increases. By the rule of aid, the aid flow for date 1 may decrease,
leading to a decrease of total investment at date 1. Hence, the capital at date 2 may
decrease, and so on. It follows that a two-period cycle may arise. Figure 6 illustrates this
cycle.20
19However, it should be noticed that the fluctuation around the low steady state is not necessarily
worse than the convergence towards this level.
20Parameters in Figure 6 are β = 0.8, τ = 0.2; δ = 0.2, A = 0.5, σ = 1.2, αi = 0.8; a¯ = 12, b = 2, φ = 2.
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4.3.2 Lucky growth
As shown above, a country having intermediate circumstances 2 with aid focus can con-
verge to the low stead state or fluctuate around it. In this section, we wonder whether
such a country can achieve growth in the long run. Notice that we continue to consider
Assumption 4 under which we have x3 < k
∗∗.
Since x3 is a local-maximum point of function G, we distinguish two sub-cases: (1)
G(x3) ≤ k∗∗ = G(k∗∗) corresponding to low dynamics of capital; and (2) G(x3) > k∗∗ =
G(k∗∗) strong dynamics of capital, meaning that with some value in (0, k∗∗) (here it is x3),
the output can overcome the critical threshold k∗∗. Condition G(x3) > k∗∗ is equivalent
to
β
1 + τ
(
1− δ + A(1 + σαia¯− b)
)2
4A(αiφ− τ) >
D + b
τ
. (25)
Under Assumption 4, the left hand side of (25) increases in a¯, σ, αi but decreasing in φ.
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The right hand side depends neither on (a¯, φ) nor on (σ, αi). Hence, condition G(x3) > k
∗∗
is more likely to hold if a¯, σ, αi are high and/or φ is low.
Let us denote
U0(k
∗∗) ≡ {x ∈ [0, k∗∗] : G(x) > k∗∗}, Ut+1(k∗∗) ≡ G−1(Ut(k∗∗)), ∀t ≥ 0 (26a)
U(k∗∗) ≡ ∪t≥0Ut(k∗∗). (26b)
Note that k∗ 6∈ U(k∗∗) and k∗ > x3. Here, k∗∗ is the high steady state. It is easy to see
that kt tends to infinity if k0 > k
∗∗. The following result shows the asymptotic property
of equilibrium capital path (kt) for the case k0 < k
∗∗.
Proposition 7 (lucky growth). Let Assumption 4 be satisfied.
1. If G(x3) ≤ k∗∗, then kt ≤ k∗∗ for any k0 ≤ k∗∗.
2. If G(x3) > k
∗∗, then we have: U(k∗∗) 6= ∅. In this case, limt→∞ kt =∞ if and only
if k0 ∈ U(k∗∗).
Moreover, if k0 ∈ UT (k∗∗), then kt < k∗∗ for any t < T , kt > k∗∗ for any t > T .
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
The first point in Proposition 7 indicates that when the dynamics of capital are weak,
then the economy never surpasses the middle-income trap.
Point 2 of Proposition 7 suggests that a poor country, receiving development aid
and having strong dynamics of capital, may surpass the middle-income in a finite period
and achieve growth in the long run. To understand better this point, let us consider
k0 ∈ U0(k∗∗). When the dynamics of capital are strong (G(x3) > k∗∗), the stock of capital
at the next period will be high (thanks to development aid) and surpass the middle-
income trap k∗∗ (i.e., k1 = G(k0) > k∗∗), and then the recipient economy may reach
growth. However, in some cases, the economy needs more than one period to surpass
the middle-income trap (for example, when k0 ∈ UT (k∗∗), the economy only surpasses k∗∗
after T periods).
21It is easy to see that the left hand side increases in a¯, σ but decreasing in φ. It is increasing in αi
because x3 < x1.
19
Figure 5: Lucky growth vs. middle-income trap. Low curve corresponds to G(x3) < G(k∗∗),
with parameters β = 0.8, τ = 0.2; δ = 0.2, A = 0.4, σ = 1, αi = 0.7; a¯ = 12, b = 3, φ = 2.
High curve corresponds to G(x3) > G(k
∗∗), with a¯ = 14, αi = 0.8, σ = 2, other parameters
unchanged.
Corollary 1. Let Assumption 4 be satisfied and assume that G(x3) > k
∗∗. If the initial
capital k0 is close enough to x3, then limt→∞ kt = ∞. However, if the initial capital k0
equals k∗ which is higher than x3, we have kt = k∗, ∀t.
Figure 5 illustrates Corollary 1. If k0 = 5, then the economy grows in the long run;
however, if k0 = k
∗ > 5, then kt = k∗ for any t. Corollary 1 suggests that a higher
initial capital does not necessarily help the economy to have more growth. Having growth
without bounds, k0 must belong to U(k
∗∗). For that reason, we use the term ”lucky
growth”, meaning that, with the same rule of aid, a poorer country may have growth but
a richer country may not.
Pointing out this scenario is also a contribution of our paper to the literature on
economic growth.
4.4 Discussion
We have seen in previous sections that the same rule of aid (a¯, φ) may generate very
different outcomes in the recipient country, following its circumstances. Focusing on
autonomous technology, government effort, efficiency in the use of aid, efficiency in public
investment and its fixed cost, we can distinguish 4 levels of circumstances, ranked from
low to high quality: low circumstances, intermediate circumstances with government effort
focus, intermediate circumstances with foreign aid focus, and high circumstances. If the
recipient has a relatively high-quality of circumstances, the development aid may help
it to reach economic growth whatever the initial capital. Consequently, there will exist
a period when this economy no longer needs international aid to stimulate its economic
development. In the opposite circumstances with low-quality circumstances, our analysis
shows that the recipient country would obtain an economic take-off only if aid flows are
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sufficiently high. This result might justify a scaling-up of aid for countries suffering initial
disadvantages which are not in favor of generating economic growth.
Concerning two intermediate circumstances (focusing on foreign aid or not), as we have
shown in Section 4.2 and Section 4.3, their equilibrium outcomes are very different. On
the one hand, under the intermediate circumstances 1 with domestic investment focus, k∗
is the only steady state and can be viewed as a poverty trap of the economy. The economy
will collapse in the long run if and only if the initial capital of the country is lower than
this trap. In this case, development aid may promote growth in the recipient country,
but under the condition that the use of aid is efficient enough. On the other hand, under
the intermediate circumstances 2 with foreign aid focus, there exists two steady states.
The lower one k∗ can be interpreted as a middle-income trap. In this case, with foreign
aid, the economy never collapses, even if its initial capital is very low. However, it does
not necessarily mean that the economy will grow in the long run. Instead, the outcomes
are fragile. Indeed, it may converge to the middle-income trap or fluctuate around it.
With some luck (strong dynamics of capital), the economy may benefit development aid
to improve its public investment (including R&D) and thanks to this, it can surpass the
poverty trap (i.e. the higher steady-state k∗∗) and get grow after a finite period. To sum
up, focusing on foreign aid would make the development process of the recipient country
more complicated to predict.
4.5 Extensions
We now consider extensions of our framework to show the robustness of our results and
insights. Assume now that aid flow is at = a(kt) instead of equation (1). The flow
of new technology depends on the tax revenue and the aid flow in the following way:
Ht = H
(
τkt, a(kt)
)
(instead of σBt). Assume that the TFP depends on new tech-
nologies: At = P (Ht). Consequently, the TFP has the following form instead of (4):
At = P
(
H
(
τkt, a(kt)
))
. The dynamics of capital (8a) becomes
kt+1 = G(kt) ≡ f(kt)kt, where f(kt) ≡ β
1− δ + P
(
H
(
τkt, a(kt)
))
1 + τ
(27)
We introduce natural assumptions on the functions a, P and H.
Assumption (a). The function a(·) : R+ → R+ is continuous, concave, strictly decreas-
ing on [0, k¯] and differentiable on (0, k¯). a(0) = a¯ > 0, a(k) = 0 ∀k ≥ k¯
Assumption (P). The function P (·) : R+ → R+ is continous, strictly increasing on
[b,∞) and differentiable on (b,∞). P (h) ≥ A > 0 ∀h ≥ 0. P (h) = A if and only if h ≤ b
(A represents the autonomous productivity).
Assumption (H). The function H(·) : R2+ → R+ is differentiable, strictly concave,
strictly increasing in each component. The aid is not essential: H(x1, 0) > 0 ∀x1 > 0.
Assume also that 1+τ
β
+ δ − 1 > A and H(∞, 0) > hp where
hp ≡ P−1
(1 + τ
β
+ δ − 1
)
. (28)
First, we study steady states. A steady state k > 0 is determined by f(k) = 1, i.e.,
P
(
H
(
τk, a(k)
))
=
1 + τ
β
+ δ − 1. (29)
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Lemma 5. Let Assumptions (a), (P) and (H) be satisfied. There are at most 3 steady
states.
In the proof of Lemma 5 (see Appendix A.6), we provide a necessary and sufficient
condition under which there are i (i=1,2,3) steady states. In particular, if H
(
τk, a(k)
)
=
σ(τk)m
(
1 +αi(a¯−φk)+
)n
and P (h) = A(1 + (h− b)+), then there may be 3 steady states
as illustrated by the following figure.22
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Figure 6: Existence of 3 steady-states.
Second, we look at the monotonicity of the policy function G(·).
Lemma 6. Let Assumptions (a), (P) and (H) be satisfied. If I ′(x) ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ [0, k¯), then
G′(x) > 0 ∀x ∈ [0, k¯). By consequence, the function G is increasing on [0,∞).
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
Condition I ′(x) ≥ 0, or equivalently τH1(τx, a(x)) + a′(x)H2(τx, a(x)) > 0, means
that the government always focuses on the domestic investment. With the specification
(8b), condition I ′(x) ≥ 0 becomes τ ≥ αiφ.
We now present our findings concerning the dynamics of capital (27). The following
result is a generalized version of Proposition 2.
Proposition 8 (growth without bounds thanks to foreign aid). Let Assumptions (a), (P)
and (H) be satisfied. If min
(
H(τ k¯, 0), H(0, a¯)
)
> hp, then two statements in Proposition
2 hold.
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
Notice that condition in Proposition 8 is more likely to be satisfied if : (1) the fixed
cost b is low and/or the autonomous productivity A is high (because hp is increasing in
b and decreasing in A); or/and (2) the aid rule is generous in the sense that a¯ is high
and/or φ is low (because min
(
H(τ k¯, 0), H(0, a¯)
)
is increasing in a¯ and decreasing in φ).
We now extend Proposition 3 as follows:
22Parameters are: β = 0.8; τ = 0.2; δ = 0.2;A = 0.4;σ = 2.5;αi = 0.45; a¯ = 12;φ = 1;m = 0.4;n =
0.4; b = 3.4.
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Proposition 9. (growth or collapse? The role of aid.) Let Assumptions (a), (P) and (H)
be satisfied. If x
(
1− δ + P (I(x))) is increasing on [0, k¯], then G is increasing on [0,∞).
In this case, three statements in Proposition 3 hold.
According to this result and Lemma 6, we have that: if I ′(x) = τH1(τx, a(x)) +
a′(x)H2(τx, a(x)) > 0, meaning that the government always focuses on the domestic
investment, then three statements in Proposition 3 hold.
We now present results in the case where the policy function may not be increasing.
Denote k∗∗ the unique solution (if it exists) of the equation H(τk, 0) = hp. We firstly
look at the economic growth in an economy having a high initial capital.
Proposition 10 (high initial capital). Let Assumptions (a), (P) and (H) be satisfied and
H(τ k¯, 0) < hp. We have that: (1) k
∗∗ is the highest steady state; and (2) for any k0 > k∗∗,
the sequence (kt) increases and the economy grows without bounds.
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
We next look at countries having a low initial capital level. The following result
generalizes Proposition 4.
Proposition 11 (low initial capital). Let Assumptions (a), (P) and (H) be satisfied.
1. Assume that β 1−δ+P (H(0,a¯))
1+τ
> 1. If the initial capital stock k0 is low enough, then
the capital stock at the next period will be higher than k0: k1 > k0.
2. Assume that β 1−δ+P (H(0,a¯))
1+τ
< 1. If the initial capital stock k0 is low enough, then
limt→∞ kt = 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
Different from Proposition 4, we also provide a condition under which the economy
collapses. This is illustrated by Figure 6 where we see that, if the initial capital k0 is less
than the lowest steady state, then kt converges to zero.
As Proposition 7, we can prove the following result concerning the dynamics of
economies having middle initial capital.
Proposition 12 (middle initial capital). Let Assumptions (a), (P), (H) be satisfied and
H(τ k¯, 0) < hp.
1. If maxx∈[0,k∗∗] G(x) ≤ k∗∗, then kt ≤ k∗∗ for any k0 ≤ k∗∗.
2. If maxx∈[0,k∗∗] G(x) > k∗∗, then we have: U(k∗∗) defined by (26a, 26b) is not empty,
and limt→∞ kt =∞ ∀k0 ∈ U(k∗∗). Consequently, aid flow at = 0 for t high enough.
We end this section by mentioning two remarks.
Remark 4 (on the essentiality of aid). Let Assumption 1 be satisfied. We can prove
that, if the aid is essential in the sense that H(x1, 0) ≤ b ∀x1 > 0, then kt is bounded
from above.23 This leads to an interesting implication: if the foreign aid is essential for
the realization of the public investment in the recipient country whose autonomous TFP
is not high, then this country never grows.
23It suffices to prove that kt+1 < kt if kt > k¯. Indeed, if k > k¯, then a(k) = 0 and hence H(τk, a(k)) =
H(τk, 0) ≤ b. This implies that P (H(τk, a(k)) = A. By consequence, f(k) = β(1−δ+A)1+τ < 1. So,
kt+1 = G(kt) = f(kt)kt < kt if kt > k¯.
23
Remark 5 (link to Dalgaard (2008)). If we consider a particular case with a full depre-
ciation of capital (δ = 1), no fixed cost (b = 0), no capital tax (τ = 0), and the rule of
aid flows is given by at = θk
λ
t where θ > 0, λ < 0 as in Dalgaard (2008), the dynamics of
capital will be
kt+1 = βAσαiθk
λ+1
t (30)
Then, we recover a dynamic system similar to that in Dalgaard (2008). The transitional
dynamics of capital stock in (30) are much simpler than (8a) or (27) in our framework.
In Dalgaard (2008) or in (30), the characteristics of the transitional path are determined
by λ (the degree of inequality aversion on the part of the donor) while in our model they
depend on all parameters. In particular, the model in Dalgaard (2008) has at most one
steady state while ours may have two, even three.
5 Foreign aid in a centralized economy
We have so far focused on the outcomes in competitive equilibrium. In this section,
we investigate the effects of foreign aid in a centralized economy. The social planner
maximizes the intertemporal utility
∑+∞
t=0 β
tu(ct) by choosing consumption (ct), physical
capital (kt) and tax (Tt) subject to sequential constraints: ct + kt+1 +Tt ≤ F (kt, Tt−1, at),
∀t ≥ 1 where w0 ≡ F (k0, T−1, a0) is given and the aid flow at = a(kt) is a decreasing
function of kt. We assume that F (kt, Tt−1, at) = AtF0(kt) where F0 is the autonomous
production function and At = P
(
H
(
Tt−1, a(kt)
))
is the TFP at date t depending on new
technologies as in Section 4.5.
Denote St ≡ kt+1 + Tt, kt+1 = θSt, Tt = (1 − θ)St where θ ∈ [θ1, θ2] ⊆ [0, 1], where
parameters θ1, θ2 represent other potential constraints of the government, which we do
not model here. The problem of the social planner can be rewritten as follows
(CP1) : max(ct,St)+∞t=0
∑+∞
t=0 β
tu(ct) (31a)
s.t: ct + St ≤ q(St−1) (31b)
where q(x) ≡ maxθ∈[θ1,θ2] Q(x, θ), and Q(x, θ) ≡ F0(θx)P
(
H
(
(1− θ)x, a(θx)))(31c)
and q(s−1) ≡ w0 > 0 is given and the utility function u satisfies standard conditions as
required in Le Van and Dana (2003), Kamihigashi and Roy (2007).24
In particular, if there is no aid and F0(x) = x
αd , H(x) = Aex
αe , P (x) = A+a(x− x¯)+,
we recover the model in Section 3.1 in Bruno et al. (2009).
Observe that the outcomes (consumption, physical capital, and production) of the
social planner’s problem are different from those in the decentralized economy. There are
two reasons: (1) the presence of externalities in the production function, and (2) the tax
rate Tt/St is endogenous in the central planner’s problem (CP1) while it is exogenous in
the maximization problem of the household (Pc).
If the function Q(x, θ) is increasing in x, then so is the function q(x). However, theses
two functions may not be increasing. Moreover, they may not be concave and there are
24Precisely, we assume that (1) u is in C1, strictly increasing and concave and u′(0) =∞, (2) for every
S > 0, there exists a feasible path (ct, St) from S such that
∑∞
t=0 β
tu(ct) > −∞ and (3) for every S > 0,
we have
∑∞
t=0 β
tu(qt(S)) <∞, where qt is defined by q1 = f, qt+1 = q(qt).
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two thresholds in the function Q(x, θ). By consequence, providing a full global analysis of
the solution of the optimal growth problem (CP1) is a challenge. However, some clear-cut
points can be obtained. As in Section 2 and for the sake of tractability, we assume that
Q(x, θ) ≡ θx
(
1− δ + A
[
1 +
[
σ(1− θ)x+ σαi(a¯− φθx)+ − b
]+])
. (32)
Even under this specification, the solution of the problem (CP1) is not explicit as that
in Section 2.4. In order to study the properties of optimal paths, we have to understand
when q(x) and Q(x, θ) are increasing or decreasing. Similar to Lemmas 1 and 2, we can
identify conditions under which the function Q(x, θ) is increasing in x or not.
Lemma 7 (monotonicity of Q(x, θ) in x). Denote
y1 ≡ a¯
φθ
, y2 =
σαia¯− b
σ(θ(1 + αiφ)− 1) , y3 ≡
1− δ + A(1 + σαia¯− b)
2Aσ
(
θ(1 + αiφ)− 1
) (33)
where θ is given such that y1, y2, y3 are well defined.
We have that Q(x, θ) is increasing in x on [y1,∞). Moreover,
1. If 1− θ(1 + αiφ) ≥ 0, then Q(x, θ) is increasing in x.
2. If θ(1 + αiφ)− 1 > 0 and σαia¯− b ≤ 0, then Q(x, θ) is increasing in x.
3. If θ(1 + αiφ) − 1 > 0 and σαia¯ − b > 0. In this case, y2, y3 > 0, and Q(x, θ) is
increasing in x on [y2,∞)
(a) If y3 ≥ min(y1, y2), then Q(x, θ) is increasing in x.
(b) If y3 < min(y1, y2), then Q(x, θ) is increasing on [0, y3], decreasing on [y3,min(y1, y2)],
and increasing on [min(y1, y2),∞).
When θ(1 + αiφ)− 1 > 0 and σαia¯− b > 0, we observe that
y3 ≥ y1 ⇔ 1
θ
> 1 + αiφ− φ1− δ + A(1 + σαia¯− b)
2Aσa¯
while y3 ≥ y2 ⇔ 1− δ + A ≥ A(σαia¯− b).
By consequence, we have the following result.
Corollary 2. Given θ ∈ [θ1, θ2]. The function Q(·, θ) is increasing on [0,∞) if one of
the following conditions holds.
1. θ2(1 + αiφ) ≤ 1.
2. θ1(1 + αiφ) > 1 and σαia¯ ≤ b.
3. θ1(1 + αiφ) > 1, σαia¯ > b, and 1− δ + A ≥ A(σαia¯− b).
4. θ1(1 + αiφ) > 1, σαia¯ > b, and
1
θ2
> 1 + αiφ− φ1−δ+A(1+σαia¯−b)2Aσa¯ .
Interpretations: condition θ2(1 + αiφ) ≤ 1 is equivalent to 1 − θ2 ≥ αiφ1+αiφ which
ensures that the government focuses on the investment in new technology/innovation
(because Tt/St = 1− θ ≥ 1− θ2). Conditions 2 and 3 mean that the government focuses
on the physical capital (θ1 is high) and the aid is not very generous (φ is high). Under
condition 4, the government takes care of both the physical capital (θ1 is high) and the
investment in new technology/innovation (θ2 is not high).
According to Corollary 2, we obtain the following result.
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Proposition 13. (1) Under conditions in Corollary 2, the function q(x) is increasing,
and then the optimal capital path (kt) is monotonic and converges.
(2) If θ1 = θ2 = θ, θ(1 + αiφ) ≤ 1, σαia¯ > b and βθ
(
1 − δ + A(1 + σαia¯ − b)) > 1,
then every optimal capital path motonically goes to infinity and aid flow at becomes zero
when t is high enough.
Proof. See Appendix A.7.
In Proposition 13, since the function q(x) is increasing, we can apply the optimal
growth theory (see Le Van and Dana (2003), Kamihigashi and Roy (2007) among others)
to study properties (convergence, boundedness, growth, ...) of optimal capital paths.
Conditions in the second statement of Proposition 13 mean that the government focuses
on the investment in new technology/innovation, the level of efficiency σ is high, and the
aid is generous enough. Under these conditions, the economy obtains growth in the long
run whatever the level of initial output. The insight is similar to that of Proposition 2
even though the approches and proofs are different. Proposition 2’s second part is also
in line with Proposition 3 of Bruno et al. (2009). Our added value is to introduce foreign
aid and study its effects.
However, the functions q(x) and Q(x, θ) may be decreasing in x. According to Lemma
7, the function Q(x, θ) is not increasing in x only if σαia¯ > b and θ2(1 + αiφ) − 1 > 0.
In such a case, we obtain the following result showing the role of the TFP A and of the
efficiency σ as well as of the aid rule (a¯, φ).
Proposition 14. We now assume that σαia¯ > b and θ2(1 + αiφ)− 1 > 0.
Assume that the initial output of the economy w0 is low in the sense that 2σ(1 +
αiφ)w0 < σαia¯− b and 4αiφσw0 < σαia¯− b.
1. If βθ2
(
1 − δ + A + A
2
(σαia¯ − b)
)
> 1, then c1 > c0 for any optimal path, and by
consequence no optimal path converges to zero.
2. If 1 − δ + A(1 + σαia¯ − b) < 1, then the economy collapses (St and ct converge to
zero).
Proof. See Appendix A.7.
The insight of point 1 of Proposition 14 is similar to those of Proposition 4 and of
point 1 of Proposition 11: if foreign aid is quite high and the recipient country uses it
efficiently, the economy never collapses. However, point 2 shows that the economy will
collapse if the autonomous TFP A and the efficiency (σ) of public investment are low.
This is in line with point 2 of Proposition 11.
6 Concluding remarks
Our paper presents a tractable model to investigate the effectiveness of foreign aid given
the donors’ rules and by the way, we contribute to the debate regarding the effectiveness
of aid in terms of economic growth, comprising numerous empirical investigations. We
have characterized the transitional dynamics of capital in all scenarios. The effectiveness
of foreign aid depends strongly on the manners in which aid is used in recipient countries
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and on the absorptive capacity of these countries as well as the initial development level
of the recipient countries.
Our model suggests that some countries with high circumstances may not need aid
to grow. Some others with intermediate circumstances need aid for the first stages of
their development process. Foreign aid may, in some cases, help a poor country to avoid
collapse, to converge towards its low steady state, or to get an economic take-off. But
focusing on foreign aid may also make the country dependent on aid and hence economic
fluctuations may arise. Our analyses show that the recipient’s TFP, the efficiency of public
investment and in the use of aid play major roles in the recipient country’s development.
In our framework, the recipient country receives foreign aid with exogenous rules
(a¯, φ) (although the aid flow (a¯− φkt)+ is endogenous). For future research, it would be
interesting to endogenize the aid rules as well as the efficiency in the use of aid. By doing
this, we can investigate the optimal design of development aid and the reaction of the
recipient country’s government (especially when corruption may happen).
A Appendix
A.1 The solution of the consumer’s problem in Section 2
Lemma 8. Consider the optimal growth problem
max
(ct,st)t
∞∑
t=0
βt ln(ct) (A.1)
ct + st+1 ≤ Atst, ct, st ≥ 0. (A.2)
The unique solution of this problem is given by st+1 = βAtst for any t ≥ 0.
Proof. Indeed, the Euler condition ct+1 = βAt+1ct jointly with the budget constraint
becomes st+2−βAt+1st+1 = At+1(st+1−βAtst). Thus, a solution is given by st+1 = βAtst.
It is easy to check the transversality condition limt→∞ βtu′(ct)st+1 = 0.
Since the utility function ln(c) is strictly concave, the solution is unique.
A.2 Properties of function f and G
To prove Lemma 1, we need the following claims.
Claim 1 (properties of f).
1. The function f1(k) ≡ (k − a)+ is increasing in k.
2. The function f2(k) ≡ τk + αi(a¯ − φk)+ is increasing on [0,∞] if τ ≥ αiφ. When
τ < αiφ, the function f2 is decreasing on [0, a¯/φ] and increasing on [a¯/φ,∞].
3. f2(k) ≡ τk + αi(a¯− φk)+ ≥ a¯min(αi, τ/φ).
4. f(kt) ≥ β
1 + τ
[
1− δ + A
(
1 +
(
σa¯min(αi, τ/φ)− b
)+)]
.
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Proof of Claim 1. The two first points are obvious. Point 4 is a direct consequence of
point 3. Let us prove point 3. We consider 2 cases.
(i) If k ≥ a¯/φ, it is easy to see that f2(k) ≥ τk ≥ τ a¯/φ ≥ a¯min(αi, τ/φ).
(ii) If k ≤ a¯/φ, then f2(k) = αia¯+ (τ − αiφ)k.
When τ − αiφ ≥ 0, we have f2(k) ≥ αia¯.
When τ − αiφ ≤ 0, we have f2(k) ≥ αia¯+ (τ − αiφ)a¯/φ = αia¯/φ.
Claim 2. We have the following properties.
1. G is increasing on [x1,∞).
2. Assume that x2 > 0. We have G increasing on [x2,∞).
Consequently, G is increasing on [min(x1, x2),∞).
Proof of Claim 2. 1. G is increasing on [x1,∞) because when x ≥ x1, we have G(x) =
β
1−δ+A
(
1+(στx−b)+
)
1+τ
x which is increasing in in x.
2. If x1 < x2, the function G is increasing on [x2,∞) because it is increasing on [x1,∞).
We now consider the case where x1 > x2. Let x and y be such that x ≥ y ≥ x2.
We have to prove that G(x) ≥ G(y). It is easy to see that G(x) ≥ G(y) when
x, y ∈ [x2, x1] or x, y ∈ [x1,∞). We now assume that x ≥ x1 ≥ y. In this case, we
have
G(x) = β
1− δ + A
(
1 + (στx− b)+
)
1 + τ
x ≥ β 1− δ + A
1 + τ
x
G(y) = β
1− δ + A
(
1 + (σαia¯− b− σ(αiφ− τ)y)+
)
1 + τ
y = β
1− δ + A
1 + τ
y
where the last equality is from the fact that y ≥ x2 ≡ σαia¯−bσ(αiφ−τ) . So, it is clear that
G(x) ≥ G(y).
Proof of Lemma 1. 1. When τ ≥ αiφ, according to point 2 of Claim 1, the function
G is increasing on [0,∞).
2. When τ < αiφ and σαia¯ < b (or equivalently, τ < αiφ and x2 < 0). We consider
two cases.
(i) If x ≤ a¯/φ, then (σ(τx + αi(a¯ − φx)+) − b)+ = (σαia¯ − b − σ(αiφ − τ)x)+ = 0
(because σαia¯− b < 0). So, in this case, we have G(x) = β 1−δ+A1+τ x.
(ii) If x ≥ a¯/φ, we have G(x) = β 1−δ+A
(
1+(στx−b)+
)
1+τ
x. It is easy to see that G is
increasing on [0,∞).
3. We now consider the last case where τ < αiφ and x2 > 0, and x3 > min(x1, x2).
First, according to Claim 2, we observe that G is increasing on [min(x1, x2),∞).
Second, we also see that G is increasing on (0, x3). Since x3 > min(x1, x2), we obtain
that G is increasing on [0,∞).
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Proof of Lemma 2. According to Claim 2, we have thatG is increasing on [min(x1, x2),∞).
We now consider G on [0,min(x1, x2)]. Let x ∈ [0,min(x1, x2)], we have
G(x) = f3(x) = β
1− δ + A[1 + σαia¯− b− σ(αiφ− τ)x]
1 + τ
x. (A.3)
By definition of x3 and the fact that σαia¯ > b, we have x3 > 0. Moreover, f
′
3(x3) ≥ 0 if and
only if x ≤ x3. Therefore, G is increasing on [0, x3], decreasing on [x3,min(x1, x2)].
Proof of Lemma 3. Points 1 and 2 are clear. We only consider here the case where
σa¯min(αi, τ/φ) ≤ D + b and τ = αiφ. In such a case, we have
G(x) =

β
1− δ + A(1 + (σαia¯− b)+)
1 + τ
x if a¯− φx ≥ 0
β
1− δ + A(1 + (σαix− b)+)
1 + τ
x if a¯− φx < 0
(A.4)
If β
1−δ+A
(
1+
(
σαia¯−b
)+)
1+τ
= 1, i.e., σa¯αi = D + b, then G(x) = x for any x ≤ a¯/φ
(multiple steady states).
If β
1−δ+A
(
1+
(
σαia¯−b
)+)
1+τ
< 1, i.e., σa¯αi < D + b, then there is a unique steady state
which is k∗∗.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 5
Point 1. First, we need the following result.
Claim 3. Assume that a¯αi >
D+b
σ
> a¯τ/φ and x3 < x2.
If x3 > k
∗, then G(x3) < x3. And therefore, G(x3) < x3 < x2 < k∗ = G(k∗). In this
case, we have G(x) < k∗ for any x < k∗.
Proof of Claim 3. It is easy to see that if x3 > k
∗, then G(x3) < x3 < x2 < k∗ = G(k∗).
If x < k∗, then we have G(x) ≤ max
x≤k∗
G(x) ≤ G(x3) < x3 ≤ k∗.
We now come back to the proof of Proposition 5. If k0 < k
∗, according to Claim 3,
we have k1 = G(k0) < k
∗. By induction, we have kt < k∗ for any t.
We now prove that lim
t→∞
kt = k
∗ for any k0 ∈ (0, k∗). We consider different cases.
Case 1: k0 ∈ (0, x3]. Since G is increasing on [0, x3], we have lim
t→∞
kt = k
∗∗ for any
k0 ∈ (0, x3].
Case 2: k0 ∈ (x3, x2]. We see that k1 = G(k0) ≤ max
x∈[0,x2]
G(x) = G(x3) < x3. Therefore
k1 < x3, and so lim
t→∞
kt = k
∗∗.
Case 3: k0 ∈ [x2, a¯/φ], we have k1 = G(k0) = β(1−δ+A)1+τ k0. Since β(1−δ+A)1+τ < 1, there
exists t0 such that kt0 < x2. Thus lim
t→∞
kt = k
∗∗.
Case 4: k0 ∈ [a¯/φ, k∗], we have G(k0) < k0 which means that f(k0) < 1. Combining
with k1 = f(k0)k0, there exists t1 such that k1 < a¯/φ. This implies that lim
t→∞
kt = k
∗∗.
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Point 2. Recall that
G(k) = f3(k) ≡ β
1 + τ
[
1− δ + A
(
1 + σαia¯− σ(αiφ− τ)k − b
)]
k (A.5)
=
β
1 + τ
[
1− δ + A(1 + σαia¯− b)− Aσ(αiφ− τ)k]k (A.6)
G′(k) = f ′3(k) =
β
1 + τ
[
1− δ + A(1 + σαia¯− b)− 2Aσ(αiφ− τ)k]. (A.7)
It is easy to compute that
G′(k∗) =
β
1 + τ
[
1− δ + A(1 + b+ 2B − σa¯αi)
]
. (A.8)
According to Bosi and Ragot (2011), k∗ is locally stable if and only if ‖G′(k∗)‖ < 1. Since
x3 < k
∗, have have G′(k) < 0. So, k∗ is locally stable if and only if G′(k) > −1 which is
equivalent to 31+τ
β
− (1− δ) + A(b− 1− σαia¯) > 0.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 4
We will find y1, y2 > 0 such that (22). Let us denote n = 1 − δ + A(1 + σαia¯ − b) and
m = Aσ(αiφ− τ). y1, y2 must satisfy
β
1 + τ
(n−my1)y1 = y2, β
1 + τ
(n−my2)y2 = y1. (A.9)
This implies that
y2 − y1 = β
1 + τ
(n−my1)y1 − β
1 + τ
(n−my2)y2 = (y1 − y2) β
1 + τ
(n−m(y1 + y2)).
Since y1 6= y2, we have β1+τ (n−m(y1 + y2)) = −1. So, we obtain
H(y1) ≡ β
1 + τ
(n−my1)y1 + y1 − 1
m
(
n+
1 + τ
β
)
= 0 (A.10)
We observe that H(0) < 0. We also see that H(k∗) > 0 if condition (21) is satisfied.
Under condition (21), there exists y1 such that H(y1) = 0. Therefore, y1 and y2 =
f3(y1) satisfy (22).
A.5 Proof of Proposition 7
Point (1). Since conditions in Assumption 4 hold, Lemma 2 implies that G is increas-
ing on [0, x3], decreasing on [x3,min(x1, x2)], and increasing on [min(x1, x2),∞). So,
maxx≤k∗∗ G(x) ≤ Max(G(x3), G(k∗∗)) ≤ k∗∗. Therefore kt = G(kt−1) ≤ k∗∗ for any
k0 ≤ k∗∗.
Point (2). If G(x3) > k
∗∗, then x3 ∈ U0(k∗∗) ⊂ U(k∗∗). So, U(k∗∗) 6= ∅.
Now, let k0 ∈ U(k∗∗), then there exists t0 such that Gt0(k0) > k∗∗, where G1 ≡ G and
Gs+1 ≡ G(Gs) for any s ≥ 1. So, kt0 = Gt(k0) > k∗∗. This implies that (kt)t≥t0 is an
increasing sequence and limt→∞ kt =∞.
Conversely, take k0 < k
∗∗ such that limt→∞ kt =∞. Since kt+1 = G(kt) and G(k∗∗) =
k∗∗, we must have kt 6= k∗∗ ∀t. Moreover, since G(k) > k for any k > k∗∗, there exists
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T0 ≥ 1 such that kt < k∗∗ ∀t < T0 and kt > k∗∗ ∀t ≥ T0. By consequence, kT0−1 < k∗∗
and G(kT0−1) = kT0 > k
∗∗. It mean that G(kT0−2) = kT0−1 ∈ U0(k∗∗). This implies that
kT0−2 ∈ U1(k∗∗). By induction argument, we have k0 ∈ UT0−1(k∗∗) ⊂ U(k∗∗).
To sum up, we have: limt→∞ kt =∞ if and only if k0 ∈ U(k∗∗).
A.6 Proof of Section 4.5’s results
Proof of Lemma 5. Let k > 0 be a steady state.
If 1+τ
β
+ δ − 1 < A, then there is no steady state because P (h) ≥ A ∀h ≥ 0.
If 1+τ
β
+ δ − 1 = A, then any k > 0 satisfying H(τk, a(k)) ≤ b is a steady sate.
We now focus on the case where 1+τ
β
+ δ − 1 > A as required by Assumption (H). In
this case, k > 0 is a steady state if and only if
H
(
τk, a(k)
)
= hp ≡ P−1
(1 + τ
β
+ δ − 1
)
(A.11)
where P−1 is the inverse function of P .
1. If k ≥ k¯, then H(τk, 0) = hp. Since H(τk, 0) is increasing in k, the equation
H(τk, 0) = hp has a unique solution in [k¯,∞) if and only if H(τ k¯, 0) ≤ hp <
H(∞, 0).
2. If k < k¯, then H(τk, a(k)) = hp. Consider the function I(x) ≡ H(τx, a(x)).
I ′(x) = τH1(τx, a(x)) + a′(x)H2(τx, a(x)) (A.12)
I ′′(x) = τ 2H11 + 2τa′(x)H12 + (a′(x))2H22 + a′′(x)H2(τx, a(x)) (A.13)
where Hi, Hi,j are the first and second order derivatives. Since H(x1, x2) is strictly
concave and a is concave, we have I ′′(x) < 0. The function I ′(x) is strictly decreasing
in x. By consequence, the equation I ′(x) = 0 has at most one solution. This implies
that the equation I(x) = hp has at most two solutions.
There are only three cases.
(a) If I ′(0) ≤ 0, then the function I is strictly decreasing on (0, k¯). The equation
I(x) = hp has a solution k ∈ (0, k¯) if and only if I(0) > hp > I(k¯).
(b) If I ′(k¯) ≥ 0, then the function I is strictly increasing on (0, k¯). The equation
I(x) = hp has a solution k ∈ (0, k¯) if and only if I(0) < hp < I(k¯).
(c) If I ′(0) > 0 > I ′(k¯), then there is a unique, denoted by xi ∈ (0, k¯), such that
I ′(xi) = 0. In this case, I is strictly increasing on (0, x1) and strictly decreasing
on (x1, k¯).
• If I(xi) < hp, then there is no steady state in (0, k¯).
• If I(xi) = hp, then xi is the unique steady state in (0, k¯).
• If I(xi) > hp > max(I(0), I(k¯)), then there are 2 steady states in (0, k¯),
the lower k∗1 ∈ (0, x1) and the higher k∗2 ∈ (x1, k¯).
• If min(I(0), I(k¯)) < hp ≤ max(I(0), I(k¯)), there is a unique steady state
(0, k¯).
• If hp ≤ min(I(0), I(k¯)), then there is no steady state in (0, k¯).
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Proof of Lemma 6. We consider two cases.
1. If k ≥ k¯, then G(x) = β 1−δ+P
(
H(τx,0)
)
1+τ
x is increasing in x. So, the function G is
increasing on [k¯,∞)
2. If k < k¯, then G(x) = β 1−δ+P (I(x))
1+τ
x, where we denote I(x) ≡ H(τx, a(x)). We can
compute
1 + τ
β
G′(x) = 1− δ + P(I(x))+ xP ′(I(x))I ′(x) (A.14)
Since I ′(x) ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ [0, k¯) and P ′(I(x)) > 0 ∀x, we have that G′(x) > 0 ∀x ∈ [0, k¯).
So, the function G is strictly increasing on [0,∞)
Proof of Proposition 8. It suffices to prove that minx≥0 f(x) > 1. To do so, we prove
that H
(
τx, a(x)
)
> hp, ∀x ≥ 0. We consider two cases.
(1) If x ≥ k¯, then H(τx, a(x)) = H(τx, 0) ≥ H(τ k¯, 0) > hp.
(2) If 0 < x < k¯, then H
(
τx, a(x)
)
= I(x). Since I(x) is concave, then I(x) ≥
min(I(0), I(k¯)) > hp, ∀x ∈ (0, k¯).
Proof of Proposition 10. Consider the function f on the interval (k∗∗,∞). Since k∗∗ is
the highest steady state, we have f(x)−1 6= 0 ∀x > k∗∗. By the continuity of the function
f(x)− 1, we must have either f(x)− 1 < 0 ∀x > k∗∗ or f(x)− 1 > 0 ∀x > k∗∗. According
to the fact that H(∞, 0) > hp, we have limx→∞(f(x) − 1) > 0. By consequence, we get
that f(x)− 1 > 0 ∀x > k∗∗.
Now, let k0 > k
∗∗. We have f(k0) > 1 and k1 = f(k0)k0 > k0 > k∗∗. By induction,
kt > k
∗∗ ∀t. So, kt+1 = f(kt)kt > kt. Thus, the sequence the sequence (kt) increases
and hence converges. If limt→∞ kt = k < ∞, we have k > k∗∗ and f(k) = 1. This
is a contradiction because k∗∗ is the highest steady state. By consequence, we have
limt→∞ kt =∞
Proof of Proposition 11. Point 1 is similar to Proposition 4. Let us prove point 2.
Since limx→0 f(x) = f(0) = β
1−δ+P (H(0,a¯))
1+τ
< 1 and the function f is continuous, there
exists f ∈ (0, 1) such that f(x) < f for any x low enough. Recall that kt+1 = G(kt) =
f(kt)kt. This implies that limt→∞ kt = 0 for any k0 low enough,
A.7 Proof of Section 5’s results
Proof of Proposition 13. The first part is clear because the function Q(x, θ) is increas-
ing in x under conditions in Corollary 2. Let us prove the second part. Since θ1 = θ2 = θ
(so that the ratio θ = Kt+1/St is constant) and θ(1+αiφ) ≤ 1, the function q(x) = Q(x, θ)
is increasing in x. So, the optimal path (kt) monotonically converges.
By using the same argument in proof of point 3 of Claim 1, we have that (1− θ)x +
αi(a¯ − φθx)+ ≥ min(a¯αi, a¯1−θθφ ) = a¯αi where the last equality is ensured by condition
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θ(1 + αiφ) ≤ 1. By consequence, σ
(
(1− θ)x+ αi(a¯− φθx)+
)− b ≥ σαia¯− b > 0 ∀x ≥ 0.
This implies that(
σ
(
(1− θ)x+ αi(a¯− φθx)+
)− b)+ = σ((1− θ)x+ αi(a¯− φθx)+)− b ∀x ≥ 0.
We consider two cases.
1. a¯− φθx > 0. In this case, we have
q(x) = θx
(
1− δ + A(1 + σαia¯− b) + Aσx(1− (1 + αiφ)θ)) (A.15)
βq′(x) = βθ
(
1− δ + A(1 + σαia¯− b) + 2Aσx(1− (1 + αiφ)θ)) (A.16)
≥ βθ(1− δ + A(1 + σαia¯− b)) > 1. (A.17)
2. a¯− φθx ≤ 0. In this case, we have
q(x) = θx
(
1− δ + A(1 + σ(1− θ)x− b)) (A.18)
βq′+(x) = βθ
(
1− δ + A(1− b) + 2Aσx(1− θ)) (A.19)
≥ βθ
(
1− δ + A(1− b) + 2Aσ a¯
φθ
(
1− θ)) (A.20)
≥ βθ
(
1− δ + A(1− b) + 2Aσa¯αi) > 1 (A.21)
where q′+(x) ≡ lim sup↓0 q(x+)−q(x) . Since βθ
(
1 − δ + A(1 + σαia¯ − b)) > 1, we obtain
that βq′+(x) > 1 ∀x > 0. Applying Proposition 4.6 in Kamihigashi and Roy (2007), every
optimal capital path goes to infinity.
Proof of Proposition 14. Step 1. let x be such that 4αiφσx < σαia¯ − b and 2σ(1 +
αiφ)x < σαia¯−b which implies that σαiφx < σαia¯−b and φx < a¯. We have φθx ≤ φx < a¯
∀θ ≤ θ2 ≤ 1. Then (a¯− φθx)+ = a¯− φθx.
Since σαiφx < σαia¯− b and θ ≤ 1, we get that
σ(1− θ)x+ σαi(a¯− φθx)+ ≥ σαi(a¯− φθx)+ = (σαia¯− σαiφθx)+ > b.
Therefore, we have
Q(x, θ) = Q3(x, θ) ≡ θx
(
1− δ + A
[
1 + σ(1− θ)x+ σαi(a¯− φθx)− b
])
(A.22)
= θx
(
1− δ + A(1 + σx+ σαia¯− b)− (1 + αiφ)Aσxθ). (A.23)
We have ∂Q(x,θ)
∂θ
= x
(
1 − δ + A(1 + σx + σαia¯ − b) − 2(1 + αiφ)Aσxθ) > 0 because
2σ(1 + αiφ)x < σαia¯ − b. So, the function Q(x, θ) is increasing in θ which implies that
q(x) = maxθQ(x, θ) = Q(x, θ2) and
q(x) = θ2x
(
1− δ + A(1 + σαia¯− b)− (θ2(1 + αiφ)− 1)Aσx
)
(A.24)
q′(x) = θ2
(
1− δ + A(1 + σαia¯− b)− 2
(
θ2(1 + αiφ)− 1
)
Aσx
)
. (A.25)
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Denote q¯(θ2, δ, A, σ, αi, a¯, b) ≡ θ2
(
1− δ+A+ A
2
(σαia¯− b)
)
. Since 4αiφσx < σαia¯− b, we
have
q′(x) ≥ θ2
(
1− δ + A(1 + σαia¯− b)− 2αiφAσx
)
≥ q¯(θ2, δ, A, σ, αi, a¯, b) (A.26)
Step 2. Assume that w0 satisfies 2σ(1 +αiφ)w0 < σαia¯− b and 4αiφσw0 < σαia¯− b.
We have S0 < w0. Step 1 implies that q(S0) = Q3(S0, θ2) which is differentiable in S0.
So, we have the Euler equation: u′(c0) = βu′(c1)q′(S0).
1. Assume also that βq¯(θ2, δ, A, σ, αi, a¯, b) > 1. Then S0 < w0. Again, according to
Step 1, we have q′(S0) > q¯(θ2, δ, A, σ, αi, a¯, b) and hence
u′(c0) = βu′(c1)q′(S0) ≥ u′(c1)βq¯(θ2, δ, A, σ, αi, a¯, b) ≥ u′(c1) (A.27)
From this, we obtain that c1 > c0. By consequence, no optimal path (St) converges
to zero.
2. If q ≡ 1− δ +A(1 + σαia¯− b) < 1, then q(S0) < qS0 < qS0. By induction, we have
q(St) ≤ qtS0 ∀t ≥ 0. This implies that St and ct converge to zero, i.e., the economy
collapses.
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